

Problems for Immediate Decision

1. Is it reaffirmed that we will not negotiate any non-Cuban matter with the Russians until the offensive threat in Cuba is removed?
 - a. If so, leaks of the Murray Harder type should be denied and countered.
 - b. The consistent position on a Summit talk would be that none is possible without prior removal of the offensive threat.
 - c. These positions should be emphasized publicly and in diplomatic channels.

2. Are we for or against Latin American and African nuclear free zones?

There are substantial issues involved both ways. (On balance I think the pros outweigh cons.) But we should not use this for pressure in the U.N.G.A. unless we really want the zones. Otherwise we would in fact be trading under threat.

3. Should we not use this occasion to secure legitimacy for the principle of surveillance. There are several ways of doing this, including publicity coupled with firm certification, OAS participation, etc.

4. Should we not use this occasion to validate the principle of inspection?

We can do this:

- a. By inspection of ships in a manner that is as effective and efficient as possible.

- b. By inspecting Bloc non-Soviet ships, as well as neutrals, even if we wish to discourage Soviet ships from coming at all.

- c. By including adequate inspection procedures in the S.A. proposal if adopted.

5. Should we not set up a procedure that the Soviets might be prepared to follow re defusing the present threat?

- a. Direct Castro (not K) to halt all construction at sites, and assembly of aircraft.

b. Disassemble IL28's and MIG 21's, open all crates and display disassembled parts next to runway at the field where they now are.

c. Move all MRBM erectors to a specified site on a given hour, all missiles to another widely separated site at a given hour, all missile fuel trucks to a widely separated third site, and all auxiliary equipment to a fourth site.

Subsequently we could monitor the movement to port and debarkation of each set of items at separate times.

IRBM procedures for dismantling could be worked out separately.

6. Should we not promptly put surface-to-air missiles and Komars on Proclamation list? Done

In any final settlement of the Cuban issue we do not want a continuing loophole of our having approved the supply of such items to Cuba by the Soviet Union in perpetuity.